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Academic Publishing Is Not in Crisis — It’s Just Changing
by John Hussey  (Key Accounts Sales Manager, Ingram Content Group)  <john.hussey@ingramcontent.com>
Everything changed in the fall of 2008, when  I was a sales manager for the University Press of Kentucky and 
we  had one of the most ambitious lists in our 
history.  At my seasonal meeting at Barnes & 
Noble, I received “large” trade buys, for a uni-
versity press, including more than 500 copies 
of several of our titles.  Additionally, we had a 
regional coffee table trade book with amazing 
comparable sales figures, a $45 price tag, and 
a 10,000 unit print run.
By the end of October, though, I could see 
that dramatic change was underway.  While our 
daily sales figures were strong,  sell-through at 
major retailers and wholesalers was disastrous. 
I warned my staff that in January or February 
of 2009 most of the stock we had pushed out 
so heavily into the distribution channels would 
come flying back at us and we would have to 
bear the expense.  Soon, it was  evident — we 
weren’t alone.
University presses, like every other book 
publisher, fell victim to the economic crash.  At 
Kentucky, we quickly went into triage mode 
where we analyzed every facet of the business. 
The status quo was no longer accepted; rather, 
personnel had to defend decisions in a manner 
that made us better employees who were more 
aware of the business we were in.  Thanks to 
strong management, Kentucky was able to re-
define our business in months, instead of years.
But it wasn’t just publishers who were 
forced to examine costs and practices.  Fed-
eral, state, and municipal budgets were under 
intense scrutiny, and as a result money was cut 
that had previously been earmarked for acqui-
sitions at public libraries.  State universities 
had tough decisions to make as enrollment 
numbers dipped and funding decreased.  Li-
brary budgets, unfortunately, were one of the 
places they could trim.  
For university presses, this meant  three 
simultaneous hits: their retail sales were 
down as a result of a sagging economy; their 
university subsidies were decreasing; and their 
most trusted revenue stream, libraries, weren’t 
buying at the same rate.  Ultimately, this was 
unsustainable.
Over the next few years, university presses 
devoted enormous resources to stabilize their 
businesses.  With Amazon’s Kindle emerging 
as the first legitimate eBook retailer and with 
the new iPad showing the potential of what 
enhanced content could look like, publishers 
had to revolutionize their internal workflow 
and develop new ways to distribute their books. 
From contracts and royalty structures to data 
management systems and book design, this was 
no small undertaking.  
Additionally, an eBook market in the library 
space also began to take shape.  Aggregators 
such as ebrary, NetLibrary, MyiLibrary, and 
University Press Scholarship Online were 
first to market.  The University Press Content 
Consortium powered by Project Muse and 
Books at JSTOR were quick to follow.  All 
of these platforms attempted to provide an 
economical solution for both the publishers 
and the libraries.  With models such as demand- 
driven acquisition as an option, no longer 
would publishers have to print 10,000 units on 
comparable sales histories and libraries could 
analyze what should be bought according to 
actual usage.
One of the benefits of the economic collapse 
and the model interrogation for both libraries 
and university press publishers was a higher 
level of communication between these two 
siloed groups.  Prior to 2008, university press-
es, especially within marketing and sales de-
partments, generally didn’t understand library 
purchasing and, to be quite frank, had no inter-
est in learning about it.  Sales managers took 
their approval plan num-
bers from Blackwells, 
Coutts, and YBP for 
granted.  There was an 
assumption that putting 
stock in the hands of 
the approval teams was 
where their job ended.  
After the collapse, 
however, a dialogue between the two parties 
became necessary.  At a Charleston Library 
Conference roundtable in 2010, I was aston-
ished at how poor the information exchange 
had been.  For example, many of the acquisition 
librarians assumed that most university press-
es were selling 1,000 monographs (by then 
monograph sales for a medium-sized university 
press were in the 400-500 range, now down to 
200-300), and many of the presses had never 
even seen the OASIS or GOBI library portals. 
This digital interrogation wasn’t just limited 
to eBooks.  As the eBook market was providing 
an economic bubble to help curb expenses and 
increase margin, another technology began to 
explode.  It was a new way of printing that 
would eliminate the need to overprint, ship to 
a warehouse, ship to a customer, and then ship 
back to a warehouse if the book didn’t sell. 
This new solution to a gigantic economical 
publishing problem was POD.  
Print-on-demand (POD) technology had 
existed since the late 1990s when Lightning 
Source first burst onto the scene, but only after 
the economic crash did its value proposition re-
ally make sense for university presses.  Because 
POD didn’t quite match its offset competition 
from a quality perspective, publishers often 
overlooked POD and continued with printing 
large quantities for better unit cost and better 
quality.  However, as overprinting and obsoles-
cence became a larger problem with publishers 
who hadn’t adjusted their business models and 
sales expectations quickly enough, finance 
teams began cost-benefit analyses of what a 
shift to POD might mean for their companies.
As publishers continued to work on their 
publishing programs at a high level, university 
administrators and state governments began 
some evaluations of their own.  For univer-
sities, this often meant a change in internal 
structure in terms of who university presses 
should report to, or who would control their 
subsidies.  Within a few years, presses such as 
Arizona, Indiana, Georgia, and Kentucky 
were either folded into the library or saw the 
library control their funding.  Claiming there 
were synergies within these two generally dis-
tinct operating units, administrators attempted 
to both maximize efficiency and reduce costs. 
As a result, publishers and librarians, who 
for years didn’t co-mingle, were now sharing 
office spaces.
One of the unfortunate by-products of the 
economic crash was an overall increase in 
prices for monographs.  When publishers began 
looking at internal profit/loss statements, the 
obvious choice to help offset 
the decrease in copies sold 
was to raise prices by $5 
or $10 per book.  Some 
of these decisions, as well 
as increased prices across 
major textbook and journal 
publishers, caused state 
governments to take note. 
Large states with major budgetary problems 
stemming from the crash asserted there was a 
crisis at hand:  book costs were out of control 
for their college students.  
What for decades was a relatively stable and 
rather staid industry  faced a convergence of 
events.  Simultaneously, university presses had 
to account for decreased net sales, an eBook 
technological shift, a change in printing tech-
nology, a reduction in subsidies, a movement 
toward library-university press partnerships, 
and a mandate from state governments to make 
books more affordable.  Articles in the press, as 
they seem to do every year or two, announced 
forthcoming doom for academic publishing.  
Unequivocally, however, university presses 
have responded to these challenges.
Rather than relying on pre-2008 publishing 
models, university presses continue to experi-
ment as a means to respond to all of the various 
economic factors facing them.  This year, for 
example, the University of North Carolina 
Press launched a series of open access mono-
graphs, which exist for free in digital form and 
for a small cost in a POD print format.  As a way 
to foster a closer relationship with its library, 
the University Press of Kentucky made its 
entire out-of-print library available in a digital 
repository for free.  In Florida, The University 
Press of Florida helps offset high costs for its 
college students with its open access textbook 
program, Orange Grove.  The University of 
California Press has a position open for a 
marketing manager whose responsibility is to 
help lead an open access initiative, and even the 
largest university presses, such as Princeton, 
have experimented with one-off OA projects.  
There’s no going back to the days of large 
seasonal buys at Barnes & Noble and standing 
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The Ant, the University Press, and the Librarian. 
Reflections on the Evolution of Scholarly Communication
by Patrick H. Alexander  (Director, The Pennsylvania State University Press)  <pha3@psu.edu>
The Pennsylvania State University es-tablished a press-library collaboration in 2005.  In due course, under the auspices 
of a newly created Office of Digital Scholarly 
Publishing, it successfully launched an Open 
Access monograph series, collaborated on sev-
eral library book-publishing projects, a journal 
archive, a reprint series from the libraries’ 
special collections, and another monograph/
database project.  I arrived in 2007, when 
things were just beginning to take shape.  We 
were probably not unlike many press-library 
relationships that were being formed, doing our 
best to “make our way in the world today.”  It 
wasn’t perfect, but it was decidedly a step in 
the right direction.
One aspect of the partnership became clear 
early:  Our respective, different cultures did 
not always make communication or working 
together intuitive or straightforward.  In an 
Against the Grain article that appeared in 
an issue co-edited with my friend and former 
colleague at the Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity Libraries, now the executive director of 
the HathiTrust, Michael Furlough,1 I wrote 
about those different cultures.  I reflected on a 
university press’s “assets” in the press-library 
relationship.  I proposed that presses were 
“assets,” and I discussed these, not in contrast 
to the liabilities of a library or vice versa, but 
in terms of how presses and libraries differ 
culturally.  I was spinning the differences be-
tween presses and libraries using the language 
of finance, but, in reality, I was obliquely 
pointing out that businesswise we were from 
two different planets, even if located on the 
same campus.  
Over time my take on the cultural differ-
ences in the ATG article was reinforced, and I 
pointed to those differences whenever I talked 
about Penn State’s press-library relationship. 
Three assets — more properly cultural differ-
ences — continue to hold import for me, and I 
suspect they could hold for other press-library 
relationships.  Understanding and managing 
these cultural differences, as nearly as I can tell, 
continues to play an ongoing and determinative 
role in how presses and libraries will or will 
not work together.  With a little elaboration, I 
review them below.
Although presses range widely in terms of 
size, audience, and mission — University of 
Chicago Press is not like the University of 
Oklahoma Press, and University of Michigan 
Press is not like Kent State University Press 
— most generally face outward to scholarly 
associations, researchers, and society writ 
large, rather than inward toward their campus-
es.  Libraries, however, typically look inward, 
locally, toward their faculty and students. 
Understandably, that means libraries, com-
paratively, have enviable influence and power 
inside the university.  They have solid networks 
and access to campus resources.  They have the 
ear of the provost, may have contact with the 
president, and have a deep institutional history. 
Plus, people — donors — give libraries money. 
In contrast presses construct networks with 
societies, researchers, institutes, and authors, 
often in subject areas only loosely connected 
with the university.  Consequently, presses 
historically built few if any powerful allies 
inside the university.  Moreover, presses only 
rarely receive significant capital support.  Once 
a press was moved under a library, for good or 
for ill, it quickly learned what a difference a 
library could make vis à vis recognition and 
access on one’s own campus.  For the first 
time, a few presses found institutional support 
and political cover in their relationship with 
the library.
Presses operate on the basis of a (theoreti-
cally) revenue-generating, cost-recovery mar-
ket model; libraries operate on a subsidized, 
expenditure-based budget.  As I have said 
often, libraries are given a pot of money out 
of which they must control their expenditures 
and operate successfully.  Presses, in contrast, 
are given a largely empty pot (an average 
allocation applied to operating expenses is 
8%–13%2) and are told to fill it with money. 
While neither is easy, those two approaches 
to managing finances are wildly different. 
Understanding existentially the difference be-
tween the two approaches is nearly impossible 
for either side and is the source for ongoing 
misunderstanding.
A third difference is linked both to the 
inward/outward and to the difference in how 
finances operate.  On the one hand, libraries 
are service-oriented; their “performance” does 
not depend on generating revenue to pay for 
costs.  Although they obviously need money 
to offer services, the work that libraries do 
does not itself typically generate that revenue. 
Presses, on the other hand, are product-driven, 
and they are product-driven precisely because 
their product’s sales performance determines 
their financial outcome.  They’re not spending 
from a pot of money, but are trying to fill that 
pot.  But presses do more than cover operating 
costs when they sell a book or article.  They are 
also generating a positive return (Tenure and 
Promotion) for their authors, societies, uni-
versities, and other partners, and they squirrel 
away money for the future.  Libraries acquire 
their enormous clout and influence on campus 
precisely because they are so good at serving 
the campus community with the resources they 
receive.  A library accomplishes its mission by 
serving its campus.  Presses, however, facing 
outward and being output- or product-driven, 
are not a service culture (though they serve 
their university in other ways, e.g., in repre-
senting the university).  This crucial distinction 
dictates that libraries say yes far more than 
they say no.  Presses are exactly the opposite. 
Presses say no far more than they say yes. 
Presses simply cannot afford to say yes to every 
local or external publishing opportunity, even 
when their mission begs for them to do so, 
because measured use of resources is directly 
tied to their ability to meet their goal of output 
(=revenue).  And their survival depends on 
achieving their goal.
What has transpired since the first Against 
the Grain article appeared?  Are there any 
lessons to be learned about how presses and 
libraries can better cooperate, collaborate, 
and survive?  Evidence from the AAUP report 
on press-library collaborations and from the 
Library Publishing Coalition3 confirms that 
library-press collaborations are on the rise and 
here to stay.  It seems fairly certain, too, that 
“best practices” continue to be in relatively 
short supply.  There are as many models in the 
relationship as there are presses and libraries. 
The differences, for example, among Penn 
State, Michigan, Indiana, and Temple, are 
legion.  Press-library partnerships remain in 
ferment, and no single template for how these 
partnerships work exists.  
Over time, both presses and libraries have 
evolved.  Cultural differences shaped that 
evolution, motivating presses and libraries to 
adapt.  Some early players, like California 
Digital Library, which is specifically designed 
to “support the University of California 
community’s pursuit of scholarship”4 have an 
established reputation and a decidedly local fo-
cus.  Others, like MPublishing, serve a broader 
community, including outside the campus.5 
Despite initiatives like the 2012 Amherst Col-
orders at library wholesalers.  The concept of 
plugging books into a traditional profit-and-
loss spreadsheet to find the correct margin is as 
antiquated as printing for two years of invento-
ry.  The future isn’t completely figured out for 
any university press.  The format, distribution 
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method, and business model will evolve, and 
each publisher will strive for the proper balance 
among brand, efficiency, and external pressures. 
One thing does remains certain, however.  As 
long as tenure exists and the monograph remains 
the most important criterion for promotion, uni-
versity presses, as the gatekeepers of knowledge, 
will remain essential.  I feel confident, having 
been there, that they will respond to any chal-
lenge, foreseen or unforeseen.  
